Channels, Spring 2019

Page 46 Wilt • The President, Foreign Policy action” in regard to the Communist island of Cuba. Rather, it “expressed the sentiments of Congress.” 64 Kennedy moved on his own volition to impose the quarantine of Cuba, and to repel USSR intervention, void congressional authorization of his military moves. President Lyndon B. Johnson further expanded the powers of the presidency by steering the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress. President Johnson brought the US to the brink of war through his actions based on the Truman Doctrine. He placed American warships in the Southeast Asia waters; then, the North Vietnamese attacked the ships. President Johnson informed Congress of this incident, and asked Congress for a resolution to support retaliatory actions. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution stated “Congress approves and supports the determination of the president, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repeal any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent any further aggression.” 65 This resolution expanded presidential powers beyond the scope of what could be comprehended: Essentially, Congress wrote a blank, legal check for President Johnson (and Nixon after Johnson) to pursue any strategy of resolving the conflict in Vietnam and beyond. Such a resolution should not have been adopted unless Congress ratified a declaration of war with clear war powers delineated to the president. In response to such a gross extension of the president’s powers, Congress later passed the War Powers Resolution. On November 7, 1973, the bill defined the limitations of the president’s authority as commander in chief, stating that the president can only introduce the United States into conflict there is a “(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.” 66 It also directs the president to consult Congress before introducing the United States into hostilities. However, the bill has several shortcomings. Who is considered to constitute Congress? The Speaker of the House, and the Majority Leader or president pro tempore of the Senate? All of Congress? The foreign affairs committees in the House and Senate? What about the secrecy of information in too many hands? Is this an overreach of congressional powers in the executive branch’s war-powers? Further, questions revolve around when the timing of the days begins. There is also confusion surrounding the time limits of 30 days, 60 days, or 90 days. In The Presidency and the Political System , Andrew Polsky writes of the expansion of presidential powers during wartime. He writes that a “wartime president can capitalize on these circumstances to frame national war goals and define military strategy on his own terms.” 67 This is seen virtually every time the United States is ushered into a war: Roosevelt in World War II; Truman in World War II and the Korean War; and Johnson in Vietnam. Even more so, he highlights the national security crisis point that dramatically centralizes the focus of any response or reaction, militarily or politically, on the central military and foreign policy maker – the president of the United States. Polsky also points to an original Founder, Alexander Hamilton, stating, “presidential control over lesser military actions also comports with Alexander Hamilton’s vision of the executive as the branch capable of acting with energy to meet a crisis. Initiative then rests with the president.” 68 64 Fisher, Presidential War Power , 125. 65 Johnson, Lyndon B. “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.” Evolving Presidency , edited by Michael Nelson, Los Angeles: Sage Books, 2016. Pages 182-186. 66 Ibid. 67 Polsky, Andrew J. “The Presidency at War: The Window of Agency in Wartime Presidential Leadership.” The Presidency and the Political System, 10 th edition, edited by Michael Nelson. CQ Press, 2014. Pages 525-545. 68 Ibid.