Channels, Spring 2019

Page 48 Wilt • The President, Foreign Policy “congressional authorization.” 74 After obtaining an 18-month restriction on responding to the Lebanese terrorist attacks, Reagan opposed the restriction of 18-months on him as arbitrary, and practically unwise. Reagan also disagreed with Congress’ setting the initial time of the outbreak to a certain date. Moreover, the war itself lasted two years – well beyond the 18-month restriction. Conclusion On the whole, the legislature has been compliant to the wishes and leadership of the executive branch concerning war and treaties. Congress has willingly supported many presidents’ actions and desires concerning foreign policy approaches. They retroactively supported Lincoln’s actions concerning the blockade of Southern rebellious states, declared war on Mexico upon Pierce’s request, granted Johnson vague war powers in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, supported Jefferson’s purchase of the Louisiana Territory and Pierce’s Gadsden Purchase, and approved the military actions of President Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, following the escalation of the VietnamWar – culminating with corruption reports and the overall public distrust of the federal government – Congress fought back in the area of foreign policy and passed the War Powers Act, which limited the president’s actions concerning war powers and his role as commander in chief. The legislation, though, is mired by vague timetables, and still misses the mark of limiting the president’s actions completely. However, if the legislation did severely limit the executive power, then the president’s response to an attack on American soil or American lives may be severely limited until congressional approval is declared – thereby crippling America’s ability to respond in times of national emergency. In review, the president holds the power to appoint ambassadors and cabinet members, but the Senate retains the power of ‘advise and consent’ to either accept or reject those nominees. The president retains the role of making treaties, in some cases, with the help of Congress; the Senate retains the role of ‘advise and consent,’ and can either reject or codify those treaties. The president, however, retains the power to reject or accept foreign dignitaries, can terminate ambassadors or cabinet-level secretaries and persons, and can terminate treaties with various countries. This delineates notable power of the president in the realm of foreign policy. However, the legislature retains strong authority over the president concerning his actions and policy. The Senate can reject treaties as well as appointees to the positions of cabinet or ambassadorships, limiting the president’s sole leadership in the realm of foreign policy and international security. For example, the Senate rejected the League of Nations treaty proposed by President Wilson. Moreover, Congress retains the authority over commerce and war declaration – which has been used to limit the president on several occasions. Unfortunately, the nebulous statutes within the War Powers Resolution dilutes its overall effects on Congress’ desire to limit the executive branch in war-making. Such vague statutes have led to presidential action absent congressional authorization in the name of “constitutional authority” and the War Powers Resolution. Overall, Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer seems to hold precedent as the governing philosophy of a proper understanding of presidential powers, specifically concerning war powers 75 : 1) The president’s power is at its peak when congressional approval and authorization are in place; 74 Fisher, Presidential War Power , 160. 75 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).