change or be found in members of some other category. Because this vulnerability cannot be overcome, some creationists have argued for a different approach altogether. In contrast to strict applications of character-based essentialism, the refined baramin proposal placed created kinds in the context of an area of “biological character space,” a limited set of character combinations that would allow the researcher to recognize the underlying unity of the kind (Wood et al. 2003). Using this approach, baraminology can proceed empirically without appeal to unchanging, discrete characteristics that define a baramin. This approach mimics the “population thinking” of Mayr’s approach to species, in the sense of de-emphasizing particular characteristics and emphasizing “populations” or clusters of species that share an underlying similarity that is different from other such clusters. This cluster-based approach to created kinds demonstrates that one need not be committed to evolutionary thinking to see the deficiencies of character-based essentialism, nor does population thinking entail a commitment to macroevolution. Even though the refined baramin concept allows for the rejection of character-based essentialism, the authors of that concept made no explicit judgment on the validity of the essentialist approach. Further, objections to character-based essentialism are largely epistemological, based on the inherent uncertainty of any putative list of essential characters. Thus, the ontological question remains even in deference to the refined baramin concept: Could created kinds, especially the human kind, be characterized by some set of essential characteristics which together as a system define each baramin? Indeed, one could argue that the concepts of biological character space and potentiality regions are actually a more sophisticated and flexible form of essentialism. We might refer to this approach as a systems-based essentialism, where the essential features of any created kind are found in a full suite or system of a large number of discrete characters, which together constitute a functional system that is essential to that created kind. As a system, we might observe that the discrete characteristics are redundant (and potentially modular), thus the system can form from different combinations of the characteristics. In this way, none of the discrete characters are truly essential, but the system they form is. Consequently, we could continue to affirm an essentialist approach (especially as we attempt to distinguish human from nonhuman), while we might simultaneously be skeptical of character-based essentialism, especially of the practical application of character-based essentialism. Thus, we should seriously consider the pragmatic value of the essentialist approach to created kinds, especially in the identification of humans in the fossil record. Should we try to distinguish humans from nonhumans by a simple list of traits that distinguish extant humans and apes? More succinctly, when presented with a new “ape-man” fossil, could its status as human or ape be established quickly based on a small number of essential characters? If so, character-based essentialism would be empirically justified, but if not, a systems-based approach, such as using the refined baramin concept in statistical baraminology, would be preferable. In favor of the character-based essentialist approach, we can easily list a large number of differences between humans and apes. With more careful examination, we can compose a list of characteristics that distinguish human from chimpanzee skeletons. Such features include the larger endocranial volume, the mental eminence, relatively smaller canines, a forward positioned foramen magnum, laterally facing glenoid fossa, relatively shorter forearms, relatively shorter metacarpals and manual phalanges, opposable thumb, lumbar lordosis, five lumbar vertebrae, a bowl-shaped pelvis, a deep patellar groove on the distal femur, bicondylar angle >4°, and an adducted hallux. Again, this list of characters brings to mind the persistent problem of essentialism mentioned above. How do we know these characteristics are the essential human characteristics? Surely being human does not reduce to a bowl-shaped pelvis or a laterally facing glenoid fossa? When thinking of the “essence” of humanity, one might think of our vast intellectual superiority, our unrivaled artistic creativity, or our spiritual relationship with God. Yet these attributes are more obviously “systems” and not easily detected in a skeleton, much less in partial and fragmentary skeletal remains. We are therefore reduced by necessity to using skeletal characteristics that may or may not diagnose our humanity. That said, since we cannot be sure any list of skeletal characteristics consists of truly essential characteristics, the best we can do in testing character-based essentialism is to evaluate whether any particular character is valuable in distinguishing human from nonhuman. This strategy raises a second problem: In order to adequately test character-based essentialism, we would need to know which skeletons are human and which are not. Since that is the very question at hand, how can character-based essentialism ever be fully tested even if it might be true? We cannot know what characteristics are essential, and we have no reference set of taxa upon which we could test our putative essential characteristics. Still, we may tentatively evaluate specific essentialist approaches using taxa that young-age creationists generally agree on. For example, bipedalism is commonly asserted to be an essential characteristic of humans, and we could test its essentiality by evaluating characteristics functionally associated with bipedalism in Australopithecus africanus, a taxon that all creationists agree is not human. Similarly, we could evaluate any list of human essential characteristics by its ability to identify Neandertals as human or Australopithecus africanus as nonhuman. Here we would again rely on the unanimous agreement of young-age creationists that Neandertals were human and Au. africanus were not. In this way, we can evaluate whether specific accounts of essential characteristics are successful in recovering the correct classification of taxa that we strongly believe belong to either the human or nonhuman category. Another potential evaluation of the character-based essentialist approach would be to look for agreement between different essentialist methodologies. For example, we might construct different lists of purported essential characteristics and look for agreement or disagreement in the resulting classification. Alternatively, we might use different classification methods with the same set of purported essential characteristics and look for agreement in the classifications. Finally, we might compare classifications using essentialist-derived characteristics to our best estimates of the human kind based on previous baraminology research. None of these would be sufficient to fully test character-based essentialism (which is unfalsifiable), but WOOD Essentialism and Human Kind 2023 ICC 89
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTM4ODY=